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Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex and Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 (2024) A theory of fair CEO pay. American Economic Review. ISSN 0002-8282 (In Press)
Edmans, Alex, Gosling, Tom and Jenter, Dirk ORCID: 0000-0003-4168-9329 (2023) CEO compensation: evidence from the field. Journal of Financial Economics, 150 (3). ISSN 0304-405X
Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex and Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 (2022) How should performance signals affect contracts? Review of Financial Studies, 35 (1). 168 - 206. ISSN 0893-9454
Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex and Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 (2019) The informativeness principle without the first-order approach. Games and Economic Behavior, 113. 743 - 755. ISSN 0899-8256
Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex and Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 (2018) Does improved information improve incentives? Journal of Financial Economics, 130 (2). 291 - 307. ISSN 0304-405X
Edmans, Alex, Goncalves-Pinto, Luis, Groen-Xu, Moqi and Wang, Yanbo (2018) Strategic news releases in equity vesting months. Review of Financial Studies, 31 (11). 4099 - 4141. ISSN 0893-9454
Edmans, Alex, Gabaix, Xavier and Jenter, Dirk ORCID: 0000-0003-4168-9329 (2017) Executive compensation: a survey of theory and evidence. In: Hermalin, Benjamin and Weisbach, Michael S., (eds.) The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance. Handbooks in economics. Elsevier (Firm), Amsterdam, 383 - 539. ISBN 9780444635303
Edmans, Alex, Gosling, Tom and Jenter, Dirk ORCID: 0000-0003-4168-9329 (2021) CEO compensation: evidence from the field. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (836). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Edmans, Alex, Gabaix, Xavier and Jenter, Dirk ORCID: 0000-0003-4168-9329 (2017) Executive compensation: a survey of theory and evidence. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (767). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex and Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 (2014) The value of informativeness for contracting. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (737). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.