Items where Author is "Chaigneau, Pierre"

Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex and Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 (2024) A theory of fair CEO pay. American Economic Review. ISSN 0002-8282 (In Press)

Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex and Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 (2022) How should performance signals affect contracts? Review of Financial Studies, 35 (1). 168 - 206. ISSN 0893-9454

Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex and Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 (2019) The informativeness principle without the first-order approach. Games and Economic Behavior, 113. 743 - 755. ISSN 0899-8256

Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex and Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 (2018) Does improved information improve incentives? Journal of Financial Economics, 130 (2). 291 - 307. ISSN 0304-405X

Chaigneau, Pierre and Eeckhoudt, Louis (2016) Downside risk neutral probabilities. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (756). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex and Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 (2014) The value of informativeness for contracting. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (737). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Chaigneau, Pierre and Sahuguet, Nicolas (2013) The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (725). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Bouvard, Matthieu, Chaigneau, Pierre and Motta, Adolfo (2012) Transparency in the financial system: rollover risk and crises. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (700). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Chaigneau, Pierre and Sahuguet, Nicolas (2012) The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (713). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Chaigneau, Pierre (2012) The effect of risk preferences on the valuation and incentives of compensation contracts. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (697). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Chaigneau, Pierre (2011) Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (693). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Chaigneau, Pierre (2010) The optimal timing of executive compensation. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (660). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Chaigneau, Pierre (2010) Aversion to the variability of pay and optimal incentive contracts. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (654). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.