Franks, Bradley (1999) Idealizations, competence and explanation: a response to Patterson. British journal for the philosophy of science, 50 (4). pp. 735-746. ISSN 0007-0882
The connection between idealizations, competence and multi-level explanations in cognitive psychology is discussed, in response to Patterson's () reply to Franks (). I argue that idealizations are inherent in competence explanations and as a result, such explanations cannot be formulated in the multi-level terms widely used in the cognitive sciences. Patterson's argument was that neither competence nor performance involve idealizations, and since they are separate 'systems', it is inappropriate to apply a single multi-level explanation to them. I suggest that there is evidence that, although competence and performance are very often explicated in terms of levels of description, both none the less involve idealizations. However, I also suggest that Patterson's argument rests on confounding the demarcation of cognitive systems. Hence, even if competence and performance are different levels of a single system, questions concerning idealizations still arise when they are combined in an explanation.
|Additional Information:||© 1999 British Society for the Philosophy of Science|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology|
|Sets:||Departments > Social Psychology|
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