Franks, Bradley (1999) Idealizations, competence and explanation: a response to Patterson. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 50 (4). pp. 735-746. ISSN 0007-0882
Abstract
The connection between idealizations, competence and multi-level explanations in cognitive psychology is discussed, in response to Patterson's ([1998]) reply to Franks ([1995]). I argue that idealizations are inherent in competence explanations and as a result, such explanations cannot be formulated in the multi-level terms widely used in the cognitive sciences. Patterson's argument was that neither competence nor performance involve idealizations, and since they are separate 'systems', it is inappropriate to apply a single multi-level explanation to them. I suggest that there is evidence that, although competence and performance are very often explicated in terms of levels of description, both none the less involve idealizations. However, I also suggest that Patterson's argument rests on confounding the demarcation of cognitive systems. Hence, even if competence and performance are different levels of a single system, questions concerning idealizations still arise when they are combined in an explanation.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/ |
| Additional Information: | © 1999 British Society for the Philosophy of Science |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology |
| Sets: | Departments > Social Psychology Departments > Psychological and Behavioural Science |
| Date Deposited: | 11 Jun 2007 |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/981/ |
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