Animal cognition and human values

Birch, Jonathan ORCID: 0000-0001-7517-4759 (2018) Animal cognition and human values. Philosophy of Science, 85 (5). pp. 1026-1037. ISSN 0031-8248

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Abstract

Animal welfare scientists face an acute version of the problem of inductive risk, since they must choose whether or not to affirm attributions of mental states to animals in advisory contexts, knowing that their decisions hold significant consequences for animal welfare. In such contexts, the burden of proof should be sensitive to the moral consequences of error, but a framework for setting appropriate burdens of proof is lacking. Through reflection on two cases—the case of pain, and the case of cognitive enrichment—I arrive at a tentative general framework based on the principle of expected welfare maximization. I then discuss the limitations of this framework and the important questions it leaves open.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/phos/current
Additional Information:	© 2018 The Philosophy of Science Association
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) Q Science > Q Science (General)
Date Deposited:	14 Jan 2019 15:27
Last Modified:	12 Oct 2024 23:51
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/91775

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