Mahtani, Anna ORCID: 0000-0003-1581-4325 (2018) The dispositional account of credence. Philosophical Studies. ISSN 0031-8116
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Abstract
In this paper I offer an alternative - the ‘dispositional account’ - to the standard account of imprecise probabilism. Whereas for the imprecise probabilist, an agent’s credal state is modelled by a set of credence functions, on the dispositional account an agent’s credal state is modelled by a set of sets of credence functions. On the face of it, the dispositional account looks less elegant than the standard account – so why should we be interested? I argue that the dispositional account is actually simpler, because the dispositional choice behaviour that fixes an agent’s credal state is faithfully depicted in the model of that agent’s credal state. I explore some of the implications of the account, including a surprising implication for the debate over dilation.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | https://www.springer.com/philosophy/journal/11098 |
Additional Information: | © 2018 The Author |
Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
Date Deposited: | 23 Nov 2018 12:23 |
Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 13:27 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/90719 |
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