Birch, Jonathan ORCID: 0000-0001-7517-4759
(2019)
Joint know-how.
Philosophical Studies, 176 (12).
3329 - 3352.
ISSN 0031-8116
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Abstract
When two agents engage in a joint action, such as rowing together, they exercise joint know-how. But what is the relationship between the joint know-how of the two agents and the know-how each agent possesses individually? I construct an “active mutual enablement” (AME) account of this relationship, according to which joint know-how arises when each agent knows how to predict, monitor, and make failure-averting adjustments in response to the behaviour of the other agent, while actively enabling the other to make such adjustments. I defend the AME account from three objections, and I then use this account as the platform for an examination of the reducibility (or otherwise) of joint know-how to joint propositional knowledge. A summative account of joint propositional knowledge is incompatible with the reduction of joint know-how to joint propositional knowledge, whereas a distributive account is not (although serious difficulties for any such reduction remain). I close by highlighting some open questions the AME account brings into view concerning the evolutionary origin and scaling up of joint know-how.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | https://link.springer.com/journal/11098 |
Additional Information: | © 2018 The Author |
Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
Date Deposited: | 31 Oct 2018 09:12 |
Last Modified: | 10 Aug 2024 19:15 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/90522 |
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