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On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games

Ellis, Andrew ORCID: 0000-0002-7552-4832 (2018) On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games. Games and Economic Behavior, 111. pp. 241-249. ISSN 0899-8256

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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.002


I consider static, incomplete information games where players may not be ambiguity neutral. Every player is one of a finite set of types, and each knows her own type but not that of the other players. Ex ante, players differ only in their taste for outcomes. If every player is dynamically consistent with respect to her own information structure and respects Consequentialism, then players act as if expected utility for uncertainty about types.

Item Type: Article
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Additional Information: © 2018 Elsevier Inc.
Divisions: Economics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Date Deposited: 23 Jul 2018 09:49
Last Modified: 20 Oct 2021 00:39

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