Alhashel, Bader and Albader, Sulaiman H. (2018) How do sovereign wealth funds pay their portfolio companies’ executives? Evidence from Kuwait. LSE Middle East Centre papers series (24). LSE Middle East Centre, London, UK.
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Abstract
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are major players in the global markets. This paper examines the possible value SWFs bring to their domestic holdings by examining the impact of SWF ownership on firms’ executive compensation. Using data on Kuwaiti SWFs, we find that having an SWF as an ultimate owner enhances the pay–performance sensitivity (PPS) to levels matching those in more developed markets. This pay–performance enhancement increases as the rights of the SWF to manage and oversee the firm’s cash-flow increase. Moreover, having an SWF as the firm’s ultimate owner alleviates the adverse effects of the divergence in cash-flow and control rights. This evidence supports the notion that SWFs create value for their target investments through activism, monitoring and corporate governance enhancements.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Report) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.lse.ac.uk/middle-east-centre/publicatio... |
| Additional Information: | © 2018 the Author(s) |
| Divisions: | Middle East Centre |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HG Finance |
| Sets: | Research centres and groups > Middle East Centre Collections > Middle East Centre Paper Series Collections > Kuwait Programme |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Jun 2018 14:41 |
| Last Modified: | 26 Oct 2020 00:36 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/88578 |
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