Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Group lending without joint liability

de Quidt, Jonathan, Fetzer, Thiemo and Ghatak, Maitreesh (2016) Group lending without joint liability. Journal of Development Economics, 121. pp. 217-236. ISSN 0304-3878

Full text not available from this repository.

Identification Number: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.11.006


This paper contrasts individual liability lending with and without groups to joint liability lending. We are motivated by an apparent shift away from the use of joint liability by microfinance institutions, combined with recent evidence that a) converting joint liability groups to individual liability groups did not affect repayment rates, and b) an intervention that increased social capital in individual liability borrowing groups led to improved repayment performance. First, we show that individual lending with or without groups may constitute a welfare improvement over joint liability, so long as borrowers have sufficient social capital to sustain mutual insurance. Second, we explore how the lender's lower transaction costs in group lending can encourage insurance by reducing the amount borrowers have to pay to bail one another out. Third, we discuss how group meetings might encourage insurance, either by increasing the incentive to invest in social capital, or because the time spent in meetings can facilitate setting up insurance arrangements. Finally, we perform a simple simulation exercise, evaluating quantitatively the welfare impacts of alternative forms of lending and how they relate to social capital.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2014 Elsevier B.V.
Divisions: Economics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Sets: Departments > Economics
Date Deposited: 05 Jun 2018 13:33
Last Modified: 20 Sep 2021 03:54

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item