Connectivity, clientelism and public provision

Shami, Mahvish ORCID: 0000-0001-6550-5120 (2019) Connectivity, clientelism and public provision. British Journal of Political Science, 49 (4). 1227 - 1250. ISSN 0007-1234

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Abstract

In many developing countries the rural poor often depend on patrons to act as brokers in order to get public provision from the government. The broker facilitates provision in return for securing peasants’ votes for politicians. Yet, low bargaining power of peasants allows patrons to appropriate public resources for themselves. I propose increasing peasants’ bargaining power by connecting them to markets outside their village. Making use of a natural experiment found in the construction of a motorway in Pakistan, I find public provision to be significantly higher in connected villages when compared to those which are isolated. Moreover, I find that the beneficial impact of connectivity is felt most strongly by the lower classes, who are most vulnerable to exploitation when isolated

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-jo...
Additional Information:	© 2017 Cambridge University Press
Divisions:	International Development
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform J Political Science > JQ Political institutions Asia, Africa, Australia, Pacific
Date Deposited:	31 May 2018 16:43
Last Modified:	12 Dec 2024 01:38
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/88146

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