Is the Whole Point of Human Rights Their Universal Character? A, B & C v Ireland and SAS v France

Burke, Abbey (2018) Is the Whole Point of Human Rights Their Universal Character? A, B & C v Ireland and SAS v France. LSE Law Review, 3. pp. 45-56. ISSN 2516-4058

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Abstract

The United Kingdom Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Cheshire West concerned the question of whether living arrangements for certain mentally incapacitated persons amounted to a deprivation of liberty. In finding that the test for whether someone has been deprived of their liberty is the same for a disabled person as it is for everyone else, Lady Hale reminded the Court that human rights are for everyone, because ‘[t]he whole point of human rights is their universal character’.1 But is there such a thing as universal human rights? This paper considers the philosophical and institutional complications faced by a universal approach to human rights. It argues that these philosophical and institutional difficulties are clearly played out in two recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: A, B & C v Ireland,2 concerning the Republic of Ireland’s restrictions on abortion, and SAS v France,3 concerning France’s ban on face-coverings. It concludes that the Court must not stray too far from a universal approach to human rights, lest it blot its record of success in calling out violations of rights and protecting individuals from the illiberal excesses of government.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.lselawreview.com/
Additional Information:	© 2018 The Authors
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	K Law > K Law (General)
Date Deposited:	29 May 2018 11:35
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 21:38
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/88099

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