Kleine, Mareike 
ORCID: 0000-0002-7442-7328
(2018)
Keeping tabs on your cooperating partners.
International Theory, 10 (3).
350 - 373.
ISSN 1752-9719
|
Text
- Accepted Version
Download (522kB) | Preview |
Abstract
This article argues that opportunities for unilateral influence within international bureaucracies create a delegation problem akin to that in coalition governments. Parties in coalitions that suspect each another of diverting from the coalition bargain avail themselves of mechanisms, such as junior ministers and parliamentary scrutiny, to monitor their coalition partners’ actions within the executive. Similarly, states that suspect cooperating partners of abusing their unilateral influence within the bureaucracy employ mechanisms, reminiscent of those in coalition governments, in order to ‘keep tabs’ on one another. I illustrate the plausibility of this claim using the case of the European Commission. However, this delegation problem of interstate control can be expected to apply more widely. The article has implications for the study of international organization, international delegation and informal governance.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/internatio... |
| Additional Information: | © 2018 Cambridge University Press |
| Divisions: | European Institute |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe) J Political Science > JZ International relations |
| Date Deposited: | 14 May 2018 09:27 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Oct 2024 21:00 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/87909 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
Download Statistics
Download Statistics