Cookies?
Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Is there a selection bias in roll call votes? Evidence from the European Parliament

Hix, Simon, Noury, Abdul and Roland, Gerard (2018) Is there a selection bias in roll call votes? Evidence from the European Parliament. Public Choice. ISSN 0048-5829

[img]
Preview
Text - Accepted Version
Download (313kB) | Preview

Identification Number: 10.1007/s11127-018-0529-1

Abstract

We examine the magnitude and significance of selection bias in roll call votes. Prior to 2009, all recorded (roll call) votes in the European Parliament had to be requested explicitly by European Political Groups. Since 2009, a roll call vote has been mandatory on all final legislative votes. We exploit that change in the rules and compare differences between final legislative votes, amendment votes and non-legislative votes before and after 2009, using a difference-in-differences approach with extensive controls. Using data from the Sixth (2004–2009) to Seventh (2009–2014) European Parliaments, we fail to find any large differences in voting cohesion for the main political groups. We find even less significance when we control for changes in parliamentary membership between those two periods. The results suggest that selection biases in the European Parliament associated with strategic choices are negligible.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: https://link.springer.com/journal/11127
Additional Information: © 2018 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature
Divisions: Government
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe)
JEL classification: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P16 - Political Economy
P - Economic Systems > P4 - Other Economic Systems > P48 - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights
Sets: Departments > Government
Collections > Economists Online
Date Deposited: 30 Apr 2018 11:20
Last Modified: 10 Mar 2019 00:00
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/87696

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics