Cohesive institutions and the distribution of political rents: theory and evidence

Besley, Timothy ORCID: 0000-0002-8923-6372 and Mueller, Hannes (2018) Cohesive institutions and the distribution of political rents: theory and evidence. In: Basu, Kaushik and Cordella, Tito, (eds.) Institutions, Governance and the Control of Corruption. International Economic Association. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, Switzerland, pp. 165-208. ISBN 9783319656830

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Abstract

This paper considers how public resources are distributed across groups and how this depends on the institutional environment. It shows how executive constraints and openness should matter to this and argues that a key role for institutions is to protect politically excluded groups. It develops an approach to judging political institutions based on the idea that cohesive institutions play a role when there is uncertainty about the allocation of political power. Using spatial data on night light, it shows inequality is lower with executive constraints. In addition, politically excluded groups do better within countries when such constraints are in force.

Item Type:	Book Section
Official URL:	https://www.palgrave.com/
Additional Information:	© 2018 The Authors
Divisions:	Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Date Deposited:	20 Apr 2018 10:13
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 17:57
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/87586

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