One Mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime

Do, Quoc-Anh, Nguyen, Kieu-Trang and Tran, Anh N. (2017) One Mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 9 (4). pp. 1-29. ISSN 1945-7782

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Abstract

We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions’ impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials’ promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted toward small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/app
Additional Information:	© 2017 The Authors
Divisions:	Economics Centre for Economic Performance
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Date Deposited:	04 Dec 2017 08:53
Last Modified:	24 Oct 2024 06:03
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/85928

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