Cookies?
Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions

Dütting, Paul, Fischer, Felix and Parkes, David C. (2019) Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions. Mathematics of Operations Research, 44 (1). pp. 196-211. ISSN 0364-765X

[img] Text - Accepted Version
Pending embargo until 1 January 2100.

Download (417kB) | Request a copy

Identification Number: 10.1287/moor.2017.0920

Abstract

Ideally, the properties of an economic mechanism should hold in a robust way across multiple equilibria and under varying assumptions regarding the information available to participants. Focusing on the design of robust position auctions, we seek mechanisms that possess an efficient equilibrium and guarantee high revenue in every efficient equilibrium, under complete and incomplete information. A generalized first-price auction that is expressive in the sense of allowing multidimensional bids turns out to be the only standard design able to achieve this goal, even when valuations are one dimensional. The equilibria under complete information are obtained via Bernheim and Whinston’s profit target strategies, those under incomplete information via an appropriate generalization thereof. Particularly interesting from a technical perspective is the incomplete information case, where the standard technique for establishing equilibrium existence due to Myerson is generalized to a setting in which the bid space has higher dimension than the valuation space.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: https://pubsonline.informs.org/journal/moor
Additional Information: © 2018 INFORMS
Divisions: Mathematics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Q Science > QA Mathematics
Sets: Departments > Mathematics
Date Deposited: 29 Nov 2017 14:58
Last Modified: 18 Apr 2019 23:10
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/85877

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics