Dütting, Paul, Henzinger, Monika and Starnberger, Martin (2012) Auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. In: Goldberg, Paul W., (ed.) Internet and Network Economics. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (7695). Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, pp. 44-57. ISBN 978-3-642-35310-9
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
We study individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. For multi-dimensional valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these properties for divisible items. We use this to show that there can also be no randomized mechanism that achieves this for either divisible or indivisible items. For single-dimensional valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these properties for indivisible items, but that there is a randomized mechanism that achieves this for either divisible or indivisible items. The impossibility results hold for public budgets, while the mechanism allows private budgets, which is in both cases the harder variant to show. While all positive results are polynomial-time algorithms, all negative results hold independent of complexity considerations.
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | https://link.springer.com/conference/wine |
| Additional Information: | © 2012 Springer |
| Divisions: | Mathematics |
| Subjects: | Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Nov 2017 15:50 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 17:38 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/85614 |
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