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Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions

Dütting, Paul, Henzinger, Monika and Starnberger, Martin (2013) Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions. In: Chen, Yiling and Immorlica, Nicole, (eds.) Web and Internet Economics: 9th International Conference, WINE 2013, Cambridge, MA, USA, December 1-14, 2013, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (8289). Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, Berlin, DE, 146 - 159. ISBN 9783642450457

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Identification Number: 10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_13


The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the VCG mechanism. For many valuation spaces computing the allocation and payments of the VCG mechanism, however, is a computationally hard problem. We thus study the performance of the VCG mechanism when bidders are forced to choose bids from a subspace of the valuation space for which the VCG outcome can be computed efficiently. We prove improved upper bounds on the welfare loss for restrictions to additive bids and upper and lower bounds for restrictions to non-additive bids. These bounds show that the welfare loss increases in expressiveness. All our bounds apply to equilibrium concepts that can be computed in polynomial time as well as to learning outcomes.

Item Type: Book Section
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Additional Information: © 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Divisions: Mathematics
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Date Deposited: 16 Nov 2017 15:47
Last Modified: 18 May 2024 03:45

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