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The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions

Dütting, Paul, Gkatzelis, Vasilis and Roughgarden, Tim (2014) The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions. In: Babaioff, Moshe, Conitze, Vincent and Easley, David, (eds.) Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, pp. 187-204. ISBN 9781450325653

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Identification Number: 10.1145/2600057.2602861

Abstract

Deferred-acceptance auctions are auctions for binary single-parameter mechanism design problems whose allocation rule can be implemented using an adaptive reverse greedy algorithm. Milgrom and Segal [2014] recently introduced these auctions and proved that they satisfy a remarkable list of incentive guarantees: in addition to being dominant-strategy incentive-compatible, they are weakly group-strategyproof, can be implemented by ascending-clock auctions, and admit outcome-equivalent full-information pay-as-bid versions. Neither forward greedy mechanisms nor the VCG mechanism generally possess any of these additional incentive properties. The goal of this paper is to initiate the study of deferred-acceptance auctions from an approximation standpoint. We study these auctions through the lens of two canonical welfare-maximization problems, in knapsack auctions and in combinatorial auctions with single-minded bidders. For knapsack auctions, we prove a separation between deferred-acceptance auctions and arbitrary dominant-strategy incentive-compatible mechanisms. While the more general class can achieve an arbitrarily good approximation in polynomial time, and a constant-factor approximation via forward greedy algorithms, the former class cannot obtain an approximation guarantee sub-logarithmic in the number of items m, even with unbounded computation. We also give a polynomial-time deferred-acceptance auction that achieves an approximation guarantee of O(log m) for knapsack auctions.

Item Type: Book Section
Official URL: https://www.acm.org/publications
Additional Information: © 2014 Association for Computing Machinery
Divisions: Mathematics
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Sets: Departments > Mathematics
Date Deposited: 16 Nov 2017 15:43
Last Modified: 20 Dec 2019 01:39
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/85612

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