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Bidder optimal assignments for general utilities

Dütting, Paul, Henzinger, Monika and Weber, Ingmar (2013) Bidder optimal assignments for general utilities. Theoretical Computer Science, 478. pp. 22-32. ISSN 0304-3975

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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.tcs.2013.01.030


We study the problem of matching bidders to items where each bidder i has general, strictly monotonic utility functions ui,j(pj) expressing his utility of being matched to item j at price pj. For this setting we prove that a bidder optimal outcome always exists, even when the utility functions are non-linear and non-continuous. We give sufficient conditions under which every mechanism that finds a bidder optimal outcome is incentive compatible. We also give a mechanism that finds a bidder optimal outcome if the conditions for incentive compatibility are satisfied. The running time of this mechanism is exponential in the number of items, but polynomial in the number of bidders.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2013 Elsevier
Divisions: Mathematics
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Date Deposited: 15 Nov 2017 12:19
Last Modified: 16 May 2024 01:46

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