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Auctions for heterogeneous items and budget limits

Dütting, Paul, Henzinger, Monika and Starnberger, Martin (2015) Auctions for heterogeneous items and budget limits. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 4 (1). pp. 1-17. ISSN 2167-8375

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Identification Number: 10.1145/2818351

Abstract

We study individual rational, Pareto-optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. We consider settings with multiunit demand and additive valuations. For single-dimensional valuations we prove a positive result for randomized mechanisms, and a negative result for deterministic mechanisms. While the positive result allows for private budgets, the negative result is for public budgets. For multidimensional valuations and public budgets we prove an impossibility result that applies to deterministic and randomized mechanisms. Taken together this shows the power of randomization in certain settings with heterogeneous items, but it also shows its limitations.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://teac.acm.org/
Additional Information: © 2015 Association for Computing Machinery
Divisions: Mathematics
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics
Sets: Departments > Mathematics
Date Deposited: 15 Nov 2017 11:11
Last Modified: 30 Jan 2019 20:09
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/85525

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