Populism and central bank independence

Goodhart, Charles and Lastra, Rosa (2017) Populism and central bank independence. Open Economies Review, 29 (1). pp. 49-68. ISSN 0923-7992

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Abstract

The consensus that surrounded the granting of central bank independence in the pursuit of a price stability oriented monetary policy has been challenged in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, in the light of the rise of populism on the one hand and the expanded mandates of central banks on the other hand. After considering the economic case for independence and the three Ds (distributional, directional and duration effects), the paper examines three different dimensions in the debate of how the rise in populism - or simply general discontent with the status quo - affects central bank independence. Finally, the paper examines how to interpret the legality of central bank mandates, and whether or not central banks have exceeded their powers. This analysis leads us in turn to consider accountability and, in particular, the judicial review of central bank actions and decisions. It is important to have in place adequate mechanisms to ‘guard the guardians’ of monetary and financial stability.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://link.springer.com/journal/11079
Additional Information:	© 2017 The Authors © CC BY 4.0
Divisions:	Financial Markets Group
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Date Deposited:	08 Nov 2017 14:28
Last Modified:	08 Nov 2024 02:30
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/85159

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