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The open constitution and its enemies: competition, rent seeking, and the rise of the modern state

Volckart, Oliver (2000) The open constitution and its enemies: competition, rent seeking, and the rise of the modern state. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 42 (1). pp. 1-17. ISSN 0167-2681

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Identification Number: 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00072-X

Abstract

The article presents a simple non-mathematical model that helps to explain how states emerged in medieval and early modern Central Europe. Classical feudalism is modelled as an essentially state-less political system, that is, as a market for military security characterized by intensive competition. The emergence of states is interpreted as the consequence of rent seeking taking place in this market after the medieval growth of population and the simultaneous reduction in transaction costs changed the market power of the parties contracting for the supply of security.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com.gate3.library.lse.ac....
Additional Information: © 2000 Elseveir
Divisions: Economic History
Subjects: D History General and Old World > D History (General) > D111 Medieval History
Sets: Departments > Economic History
Date Deposited: 12 Oct 2017 14:26
Last Modified: 20 Jan 2020 01:54
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/84627

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