Volckart, Oliver (2000) The open constitution and its enemies: competition, rent seeking, and the rise of the modern state. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 42 (1). pp. 1-17. ISSN 0167-2681
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
The article presents a simple non-mathematical model that helps to explain how states emerged in medieval and early modern Central Europe. Classical feudalism is modelled as an essentially state-less political system, that is, as a market for military security characterized by intensive competition. The emergence of states is interpreted as the consequence of rent seeking taking place in this market after the medieval growth of population and the simultaneous reduction in transaction costs changed the market power of the parties contracting for the supply of security.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.sciencedirect.com.gate3.library.lse.ac.... |
| Additional Information: | © 2000 Elseveir |
| Divisions: | Economic History |
| Subjects: | D History General and Old World > D History (General) > D111 Medieval History |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Oct 2017 14:26 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 21:22 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/84627 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
