Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Maturity rationing and collective short-termism

Milbradt, Konstantin and Oehmke, Martin (2015) Maturity rationing and collective short-termism. Journal of Financial Economics, 118 (3). pp. 553-570. ISSN 0304-405X

Text - Accepted Version
Download (1MB) | Preview
Identification Number: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.08.009


Financing terms and investment decisions are jointly determined. This interdependence, which links firms׳ asset and liability sides, can lead to short-termism in investment. In our model, financing frictions increase with the investment horizon, such that financing for long-term projects is relatively expensive and potentially rationed. In response, firms whose first-best investments are long-term may adopt second-best projects of shorter maturities. This worsens financing terms for firms with shorter-maturity projects, inducing them to change their investments as well. In equilibrium, investment is inefficiently short-term. Equilibrium asset-side adjustments by firms can amplify shocks and, while privately optimal, can be socially undesirable.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2014 Elsevier B.V
Divisions: Finance
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Sets: Departments > Finance
Date Deposited: 09 Oct 2017 13:54
Last Modified: 20 May 2019 01:57

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item


Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics