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Political connections and SEC enforcement

Correia, Maria M. (2014) Political connections and SEC enforcement. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 57 (2-3). pp. 241-262. ISSN 0165-4101

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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.04.004


In this study, I examine whether firms and executives with long-term political connections through contributions and lobbying incur lower costs from the enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). I find that politically connected firms on average are less likely to be involved in SEC enforcement actions and face lower penalties if they are prosecuted by the SEC. Contributions to politicians in a strong position to put pressure on the SEC are more effective than others at reducing the probability of enforcement and penalties imposed by an enforcement action. Moreover, the amounts paid to lobbyists with prior employment links to the SEC, and the amounts spent on lobbying the SEC directly, are more effective than other lobbying expenditures at reducing enforcement costs faced by firms.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2014 Elsevier B.V.
Divisions: Accounting
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Date Deposited: 02 Oct 2017 15:16
Last Modified: 20 Oct 2021 02:13

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