Personal identity, substantial change, and the significance of becoming

Otsuka, Michael (2018) Personal identity, substantial change, and the significance of becoming. Erkenntnis, 83 (6). pp. 1229-1243. ISSN 0165-0106

Text - Published Version Available under License Creative Commons Attribution. Download (536kB)

Abstract

According to philosophers who ground your anticipation of future experiences in psychological continuity and connectedness, it is rational to anticipate the experiences of someone other than yourself, such as a self that is the product of fission or of replication. In this article, I concur that it is rational to anticipate the experiences of the product of fission while denying the rationality of anticipating the experiences of a replica. In defending my position, I offer the following explanation of why you have good reason to anticipate the experiences of your post-fission successor but not your replica: in the former case, you become (i.e., substantially change into) somebody else, whereas, in the latter case, you are merely replaced by somebody else.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://link.springer.com/journal/10670
Additional Information:	© 2017 The Author © CC BY 4.0
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Date Deposited:	07 Sep 2017 13:23
Last Modified:	17 Oct 2024 17:12
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/84188

Actions (login required)

View Item