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The take-up of mechanisms designed to temper proportional representation shows that countries don’t choose their electoral systems and rules in a vacuum

Bol, Damien, Pilet, Jean-Benoit and Riera, Pedro (2015) The take-up of mechanisms designed to temper proportional representation shows that countries don’t choose their electoral systems and rules in a vacuum. Democratic Audit UK (22 May 2015). Website.

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Abstract

Some countries attempt to ‘temper’ the political party system unpredictability by introducing measures to halt fragmentation, such as representation thresholds. Here, Damien Bol, Jean-Benoit Pilet, and Pedro Riera argue that national legislators are more likely to adopt one of these electoral mechanisms when a large number of other countries have made similar choices in recent years.

Item Type: Online resource (Website)
Official URL: http://www.democraticaudit.com
Additional Information: © 2015 The Author(s); Online
Divisions: LSE
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
J Political Science > JC Political theory
J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe)
Sets: Collections > Democratic Audit Blog
Date Deposited: 14 Jun 2017 09:30
Last Modified: 20 Feb 2019 16:28
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/81166

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