Basic-know and super-know

Mahtani, Anna ORCID: 0000-0003-1581-4325 (2019) Basic-know and super-know. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 98 (2). pp. 375-391. ISSN 0031-8205

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Abstract

Sometimes a proposition is 'opaque' to an agent: (s)he doesn't know it, but (s)he does know something about how coming to know it should affect his or her credence function. It is tempting to assume that a rational agent's credence function coheres in a certain way with his or her knowledge of these opaque propositions, and I call this the 'Opaque Proposition Principle'. The principle is compelling but demonstrably false. I explain this incongruity by showing that the principle is ambiguous: the term 'know' as it appears in the principle can be interpreted in two different ways, as either basic-know or super-know. I use this distinction to construct a plausible version of the principle, and then to similarly construct plausible versions of the Reflection Principle and the Sure-Thing Principle.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(IS...
Additional Information:	© 2017 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited:	13 Jun 2017 14:56
Last Modified:	12 Dec 2024 01:29
Funders:	Leverhulme Trust
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/81112

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