Central bank governors in Europe are less likely to be removed from office if they have the same political affiliation as the current government

Ennser-Jedenastik, Laurenz (2013) Central bank governors in Europe are less likely to be removed from office if they have the same political affiliation as the current government. LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog (24 Sep 2013). Website.

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Abstract

Over recent decades it has become the norm for central banks to be made formally independent from governments and political actors. Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik writes that despite this insulation from the world of politics, the political affiliations and ideological positions of central bank governors have still played a significant role in their appointments and removal from office. Outlining the results of a study across 30 European countries, he shows that central bank governors who are more closely aligned with a country’s government are less likely to be removed from office than other governors.

Item Type:	Online resource (Website)
Official URL:	http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
Additional Information:	© 2013 The Author(s)
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe)
Date Deposited:	04 Apr 2017 12:58
Last Modified:	13 Sep 2024 18:43
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/72381

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