Chapman, Terence, Songying, Fang and Stone, Randall (2015) Greece illustrates how the politics of lending can undermine its effectiveness. LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog (18 Sep 2015). Website.
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Abstract
Why do bailout packages often fail to restore market confidence? Outlining results from a recent study, Terrence Chapman, Songying Fang and Randall Stone write that creditor countries tend to have a special interest in the crisis country whose loans they are backing. Weaker conditionality applied to countries deemed to have high levels of importance, however, has counter-productive effects, with markets anticipating that easier access to credit may lead to further fiscal instability and recidivist borrowing. They argue that in the Greek case it will be difficult to rebuild the confidence of a market shaken by several failed attempts at stabilisation, and that the country will probably require another round of debt relief.
| Item Type: | Online resource (Website) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2015 The Author(s) |
| Divisions: | LSE |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe) |
| Date Deposited: | 27 Mar 2017 14:42 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 23:58 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/70971 |
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