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Family firms

Burkart, Mike, Panunzi, Fausto and Shleifer, Andrei (2003) Family firms. Journal of Finance, 58 (5). pp. 2167-2201. ISSN 0022-1082

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Identification Number: 10.1111/1540-6261.00601

Abstract

We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on what fraction of the company to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder's decision is shaped by the legal environment. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross-country evidence.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(IS...
Additional Information: © 2003 the American Finance Association
Divisions: Finance
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Sets: Departments > Finance
Date Deposited: 22 Feb 2017 10:33
Last Modified: 20 Jun 2020 01:02
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/69549

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