Family firms

Burkart, Mike ORCID: 0000-0002-0954-4499, Panunzi, Fausto and Shleifer, Andrei (2003) Family firms. Journal of Finance, 58 (5). pp. 2167-2201. ISSN 0022-1082

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Abstract

We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on what fraction of the company to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder's decision is shaped by the legal environment. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross-country evidence.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(IS...
Additional Information:	© 2003 the American Finance Association
Divisions:	Finance
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Date Deposited:	22 Feb 2017 10:33
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 22:42
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/69549

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