One share - one vote: the theory

Burkart, Mike ORCID: 0000-0002-0954-4499 and Lee, Samuel (2008) One share - one vote: the theory. Review of Finance, 12 (1). pp. 1-49. ISSN 1572-3097

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Abstract

The theoretical literature on security-voting structure can be organized around three questions: What impact do nonvoting shares have on takeover outcomes? How does disproportional voting power affect the incentives of blockholders? What are the repercussions of mandating one share - one vote for firms' financing and ownership choices? Overall, the costs and benefits of separating cash flow and votes reflect the fundamental governance trade off between disempowering blockholders and empowering managers. It is therefore an open question whether mandating one share - one vote would improve the quality of corporate governance, notably in systems that so far relied on active owners.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://academic.oup.com/rof
Additional Information:	© 2008 The Author
Divisions:	Finance
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure
Date Deposited:	22 Feb 2017 10:16
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 23:27
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/69545

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