Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

easyJet® pricing strategy: should low-fare airlines offer last-minute deals?

Koenigsberg, Oded, Muller, Eitan and Vilcassim, Naufel J. ORCID: 0000-0003-0192-8014 (2008) easyJet® pricing strategy: should low-fare airlines offer last-minute deals? Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 6 (3). pp. 279-297. ISSN 1570-7156

Full text not available from this repository.
Identification Number: 10.1007/s11129-007-9036-2


easyJet, one of Europe’s most successful low-cost short-haul airlines, has a simple pricing structure. For a given flight, all prices are quoted one-way, a single price prevails at any point, and, in general, prices are low early on and increase as the departure date approaches. We observe from these policies and from the empirical section of this paper that easyJet employs three distinct strategies: 1) it does not offer last-minute deals, 2) it offers a single class and lets price be the sole variable that controls demand, and 3) it varies the time at which tickets are first offered for sale (duration of sale). The first two policies are in stark contrast to traditional airline pricing strategies. Many airlines offer last-minute deals, either directly or via resellers. Second, the current prevailing practice is to control demand via seat allocation to various classes rather than by offering a single class and letting price be the sole variable that controls demand. The main objective of this research is to study the conditions under which offering a last-minute deal is optimal under the single-price policy. We also learn how the duration of ticket sales is affected by consumer characteristics. We find that, for an intermediate capacity level, uncertainty with respect to the arrival of the business segment will cause the firm to offer last-minute deals and thus partially price-discriminate within the tourist segment. The same is true for uncertainty with respect to the actual behavior of the firm: if consumers are uncertain whether the firm will offer last-minute deals, then, in equilibrium, both in a one-shot game and in a repeated game, the firm will, with some probability, offer such deals. In addition, we found that for an intermediate capacity level, the larger the number of segments (that differ in price sensitivity), the longer the duration of the period in which tickets are offered for sale.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2007 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Divisions: Management
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Date Deposited: 26 Jan 2017 14:09
Last Modified: 14 Jun 2024 23:12

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item