One mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime

Do, Quoc-Anh, Nguyen, Kieu-Trang, Roiser, Anh N. Tran and Tran, Anh N. (2016) One mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime. CEP Discussion Paper (1409). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK.

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Abstract

We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of 603 ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions’ impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials’ promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted towards small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://cep.lse.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 2016 The Authors
Divisions:	Centre for Economic Performance
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Date Deposited:	09 May 2016 14:47
Last Modified:	13 Sep 2024 20:34
Funders:	Economic and Social Research Council, Economic and Social Research Council
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/66422

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