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How to guard against the risk of living too long: the case for collective pensions

Otsuka, Michael (2017) How to guard against the risk of living too long: the case for collective pensions. In: Sobel, David, Vallentyne, Peter and Wall, Steven, (eds.) Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 229-251. ISBN 9780198801221

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Identification Number: 10.1093/oso/9780198801221.003.0010


This chapter provides a defense of a type of occupational pension, known as “collective defined contribution” (CDC), which is based on the idea that it is possible to limit the employer’s liability to nothing more than a set contribution (a “defined contribution”) while retaining many of the benefits of the collectivization (pooling) of risks of a traditional defined benefit (DB) pension. CDC can be defended against a freedom-based objection from the right via an appeal to the following Hobbesian voluntarist justification: CDC constitutes a “Leviathan of Leviathans” into which it is rational for workers to choose to associate in order to tame longevity and investment risks. CDC pensions that arise from and mirror existing income inequalities can also be defended against an egalitarian objection from the left, by demonstration that they can be grounded in Rawlsian principles of reciprocity and property-owning democracy.

Item Type: Book Section
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2017 The Authors
Divisions: Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD61 Risk Management
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
H Social Sciences > HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare. Criminology
Sets: Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Date Deposited: 03 May 2016 15:02
Last Modified: 20 Aug 2021 23:30

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