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On the pragmatic equivalence between representing data and phenomena

Nguyen, James (2016) On the pragmatic equivalence between representing data and phenomena. Philosophy of Science, 83 (2). pp. 171-191. ISSN 0031-8248

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Identification Number: 10.1086/684959


Van Fraassen argues that data provide the target-end structures required by structuralist accounts of scientific representation. But models represent phenomena not data. Van Fraassen agrees but argues that there is no pragmatic difference between taking a scientific model to accurately represent a physical system and accurately represent data extracted from it. In this article I reconstruct his argument and show that it turns on the false premise that the pragmatic content of acts of representation include doxastic commitments.

Item Type: Article
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Additional Information: © 2016 Philosophy of Science Association
Divisions: Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Date Deposited: 14 Mar 2016 12:09
Last Modified: 12 Jun 2024 17:51

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