On the pragmatic equivalence between representing data and phenomena

Nguyen, James (2016) On the pragmatic equivalence between representing data and phenomena. Philosophy of Science, 83 (2). pp. 171-191. ISSN 0031-8248

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Abstract

Van Fraassen argues that data provide the target-end structures required by structuralist accounts of scientific representation. But models represent phenomena not data. Van Fraassen agrees but argues that there is no pragmatic difference between taking a scientific model to accurately represent a physical system and accurately represent data extracted from it. In this article I reconstruct his argument and show that it turns on the false premise that the pragmatic content of acts of representation include doxastic commitments.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/phos/current
Additional Information:	© 2016 Philosophy of Science Association
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Date Deposited:	14 Mar 2016 12:09
Last Modified:	12 Dec 2024 01:09
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/65717

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