Nguyen, James (2016) On the pragmatic equivalence between representing data and phenomena. Philosophy of Science, 83 (2). pp. 171-191. ISSN 0031-8248
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Abstract
Van Fraassen argues that data provide the target-end structures required by structuralist accounts of scientific representation. But models represent phenomena not data. Van Fraassen agrees but argues that there is no pragmatic difference between taking a scientific model to accurately represent a physical system and accurately represent data extracted from it. In this article I reconstruct his argument and show that it turns on the false premise that the pragmatic content of acts of representation include doxastic commitments.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/phos/current |
Additional Information: | © 2016 Philosophy of Science Association |
Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) |
Date Deposited: | 14 Mar 2016 12:09 |
Last Modified: | 12 Jun 2024 17:51 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/65717 |
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