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Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games

Nax, Heinrich H. and Pradelski, Bary S. R. (2015) Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games. International Journal of Game Theory, 44 (4). pp. 903-932. ISSN 0020-7276

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Identification Number: 10.1007/s00182-014-0459-1

Abstract

We study evolutionary dynamics in assignment games where many agents interact anonymously at virtually no cost. The process is decentralized, very little information is available and trade takes place at many different prices simultaneously. We propose a completely uncoupled learning process that selects a subset of the core of the game with a natural equity interpretation. This happens even though agents have no knowledge of other agents’ strategies, payoffs, or the structure of the game, and there is no central authority with such knowledge either. In our model, agents randomly encounter other agents, make bids and offers for potential partnerships and match if the partnerships are profitable. Equity is favored by our dynamics because it is more stable, not because of any ex ante fairness criterion.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://link.springer.com/journal/182
Additional Information: © 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Divisions: CPNSS
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Q Science > QA Mathematics
JEL classification: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
Date Deposited: 19 Feb 2016 14:43
Last Modified: 20 Jul 2019 02:04
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/65428

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