Equity dynamics in bargaining without information exchange

Nax, Heinrich H. (2015) Equity dynamics in bargaining without information exchange. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 25 (5). pp. 1011-1026. ISSN 0936-9937

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Abstract

In this paper, completely uncoupled dynamics for n-player bargaining are proposed that mirror key behavioral elements of early bargaining and aspiration adjustment models (Zeuthen, 1930; Sauermann and Selten, 118:577–597 1962). Individual adjustment dynamics are based on directional learning adjustments, solely driven by histories of own realized payoffs. Bargaining this way, all possible splits have positive probability in the stationary distribution of the process, but players will split the pie almost equally most of the time. The expected waiting time for almost equal splits to be played is quadratic.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://link.springer.com/journal/191
Additional Information:	© 2015 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Divisions:	CPNSS
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology Q Science > QA Mathematics
JEL classification:	C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
Date Deposited:	19 Feb 2016 14:12
Last Modified:	14 Sep 2024 06:54
Projects:	Advanced Investigator Grant Momentum 324247
Funders:	European Research Council
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/65426

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