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A critique of empiricist propensity theories

Suárez, Mauricio (2014) A critique of empiricist propensity theories. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 4 (2). pp. 215-231. ISSN 1879-4912

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Identification Number: 10.1007/s13194-014-0083-8

Abstract

I analyse critically what I regard as the most accomplished empiricist account of propensities, namely the long run propensity theory developed by Donald Gillies (2000). Empiricist accounts are distinguished by their commitment to the ‘identity thesis’: the identification of propensities and objective probabilities. These theories are intended, in the tradition of Karl Popper’s influential proposal, to provide an interpretation of probability (under a suitable version of Kolmogorov’s axioms) that renders probability statements directly testable by experiment. I argue that the commitment to the identity thesis leaves empiricist theories, including Gillies’ version, vulnerable to a variant of what is known as Humphreys’ paradox. I suggest that the tension may be resolved only by abandoning the identity thesis, and by adopting instead an understanding of propensities as explanatory properties of chancy objects.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://link.springer.com/journal/13194
Additional Information: © 2014 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Divisions: CPNSS
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Q Science > QA Mathematics
Sets: Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
Date Deposited: 05 Feb 2016 15:36
Last Modified: 14 Feb 2019 15:45
Projects: FFI2011-29834-C03-01, PIEF-GA-2012-329430
Funders: Spanish Government, European Commission
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/65256

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