Prato, Carlo and Wolton, Stephane 
ORCID: 0000-0003-1405-650X
(2019)
Campaign cost and electoral accountability.
Political Science Research and Methods, 7 (1).
pp. 1-21.
ISSN 2049-8470
Abstract
The increasing cost of political campaigns and its impact on the electoral process are issues of paramount importance in modern democracies. We propose a theory of electoral accountability in which candidates choose whether or not to commit to constituency service and whether or not to pay a campaign cost to advertise their platform. A higher campaign cost decreases voter welfare when partisan imbalance is low. However, when partisan imbalance is high, a higher campaign cost is associated with a higher expected level of constituency service. More costly campaigns can thus have a rebalancing effect that improves electoral accountability. We discuss the implications of our findings for campaign finance regulation and present empirical evidence consistent with our key predictions.
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