Page, Frank (2015) Stationary Markov equilibria for K-class discounted stochastic games. Systemic Risk Centre Discussion Papers (44). Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
|
PDF
- Published Version
Download (942kB) | Preview |
Abstract
For a discounted stochastic game with an uncountable state space and compact metric action spaces, we show that if the measurable-selection-valued, Nash payoff selection correspondence of the underlying one-shot game contains a sub-correspondence having the K-limit property (i.e., if the Nash payoff selection sub-correspondence contains its K-limits and therefore is a K correspondence), then the discounted stochastic game has a stationary Markov equilibrium. Our key result is a new fixed point theorem for measurable-selection-valued correspondences having the K-limit property. We also show that if the discounted stochastic game is noisy (Duggan, 2012), or if the underlying probability space satisfies the G-nonatomic condition of Rokhlin (1949) and Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976) (and therefore satisfies the coaser transition kernel condition of He and Sun, 2014), then the Nash payoff selection correspondence contains a sub-correspondence having the K-limit property.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.systemicrisk.ac.uk/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2015 The Author |
| Divisions: | Systemic Risk Centre |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HG Finance |
| JEL classification: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Jan 2016 15:16 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 20:33 |
| Projects: | ES/K002309/1 |
| Funders: | ESRC |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/65103 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
Download Statistics
Download Statistics