Ellsberg's Paradox and the value of chances

Bradley, Richard ORCID: 0000-0003-2184-7844 (2016) Ellsberg's Paradox and the value of chances. Economics and Philosophy, 32 (2). pp. 231-248. ISSN 0266-2671

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Abstract

What value should we put on our chances of obtaining a good? This paper argues that, contrary to the widely accepted theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern, the value of a chance of some good G may be a nonlinear function of the value of G. In particular, chances may have diminishing marginal utility, a property that is termed chance uncertainty aversion. The hypothesis that agents are averse to uncertainy about chances explains a pattern of preferences often observed in the Ellsberg paradox. While these preferences have typically been taken to refute Bayesian decision theory, it is shown that chance risk aversion is perfectly compatible with it.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJourna...
Additional Information:	© 2015 Cambridge University Press
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited:	06 Jan 2016 16:58
Last Modified:	14 Nov 2024 18:03
Projects:	AH/J006033/1
Funders:	Arts and Humanities Research Council
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/64847

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