Inefficient investment waves

Zhiguo, He and Kondor, Peter ORCID: 0000-0001-9797-9291 (2016) Inefficient investment waves. Econometrica, 84 (2). 735 - 780. ISSN 0012-9682

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Abstract

We show that firms' individually optimal liquidity management results in socially inefficient boom-and-bust patterns. Financially constrained firms decide on the level of their liquid resources facing cash-flow shocks and time-varying investment opportunities. Firms' liquidity management decisions generate simultaneous waves in aggregate cash holdings and investment, even if technology remains constant. These investment waves are not constrained efficient in general, because the social and private value of liquidity differs. The resulting pecuniary externality affects incentives differentially depending on the state of the economy, and often overinvestment occurs during booms and underinvestment occurs during recessions. In general, policies intended to mitigate underinvestment raise prices during recessions, making overinvestment during booms worse. However, a well-designed price-support policy will increase welfare in both booms and recessions.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14680262
Additional Information:	© 2016 The Econometric Society
Divisions:	Finance
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Date Deposited:	12 Nov 2015 10:53
Last Modified:	03 Oct 2024 06:12
Projects:	336585
Funders:	European Research Council
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/64412

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