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Personal sovereignty and our moral rights to non-interference

Burri, Susanne (2017) Personal sovereignty and our moral rights to non-interference. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 34 (5). pp. 621-634. ISSN 1468-5930

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Identification Number: 10.1111/japp.12175


In this paper, I defend the inviolability approach to solving the paradox of deontology against a criticism raised by Michael Otsuka. The paradox of deontology revolves around the question whether it should always be permissible to infringe someone's right to non-interference when this would serve to minimize the overall number of comparable rights infringements that occur. According to the inviolability approach, rights to non-interference protect and give expression to our personal sovereignty, which is not advanced through the minimization of rights infringements. This seems to dissolve the paradox. Otsuka, however, contends that the proposed solution may rely on too narrow an understanding of personal sovereignty. He suggests that personal sovereignty may come with an enforceability dimension that undermines the inviolability approach. While I agree with Otsuka that enforceability is an important aspect of per- sonal sovereignty, I argue that properly construed, the enforceability dimension of personal sovereignty does not undermine the inviolability approach.

Item Type: Article
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Additional Information: © 2016 Society for Applied Philosophy
Divisions: Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Date Deposited: 02 Nov 2015 10:59
Last Modified: 10 Jul 2024 16:03

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