Faure-Grimaud, Antoine and Inderst, Roman (2005) Conglomerate entrenchment under optimal financial contracting. American Economic Review, 95 (3). 850 - 861. ISSN 0002-8282
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Identification Number: 10.1257/0002828054201260
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2005 American Economic Association |
| Divisions: | Financial Markets Group STICERD |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HG Finance |
| JEL classification: | G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration; Conglomerates; Subsidiaries |
| Date Deposited: | 03 Jul 2008 12:53 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 22:01 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/6376 |
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