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The take-up of mechanisms designed to temper proportional representation shows that countries don’t choose their electoral systems and rules in a vacuum

Bol, Damian and Pilet, Jean-Benoit and Riera, Pedro (2015) The take-up of mechanisms designed to temper proportional representation shows that countries don’t choose their electoral systems and rules in a vacuum. Democratic Audit Blog (22 May 2015). Blog Entry.

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Abstract

Some countries attempt to ‘temper’ the political party system unpredictability by introducing measures to halt fragmentation, such as representation thresholds. Here, Damien Bol, Jean-Benoit Pilet, and Pedro Riera argue that national legislators are more likely to adopt one of these electoral mechanisms when a large number of other countries have made similar choices in recent years.

Item Type: Website (Blog Entry)
Official URL: http://www.democraticaudit.com/
Additional Information: © 2015 Democratic Audit UK
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform
Sets: Collections > Democratic Audit Blog
Date Deposited: 21 Aug 2015 09:45
Last Modified: 21 Aug 2015 09:45
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/63286

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