Bol, Damien, Pilet, Jean-Benoit and Riera, Pedro (2015) The take-up of mechanisms designed to temper proportional representation shows that countries don’t choose their electoral systems and rules in a vacuum. Democratic Audit Blog (22 May 2015). Blog Entry.
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Abstract
Some countries attempt to ‘temper’ the political party system unpredictability by introducing measures to halt fragmentation, such as representation thresholds. Here, Damien Bol, Jean-Benoit Pilet, and Pedro Riera argue that national legislators are more likely to adopt one of these electoral mechanisms when a large number of other countries have made similar choices in recent years.
Item Type: | Online resource (Blog Entry) |
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Official URL: | http://www.democraticaudit.com |
Additional Information: | © 2015 The Author(s) |
Divisions: | LSE |
Subjects: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) J Political Science > JC Political theory J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General) J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe) |
Date Deposited: | 21 Aug 2015 09:45 |
Last Modified: | 14 Sep 2024 03:53 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/63286 |
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