The take-up of mechanisms designed to temper proportional representation shows that countries don’t choose their electoral systems and rules in a vacuum

Bol, Damien, Pilet, Jean-Benoit and Riera, Pedro (2015) The take-up of mechanisms designed to temper proportional representation shows that countries don’t choose their electoral systems and rules in a vacuum. Democratic Audit Blog (22 May 2015). Blog Entry.

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Abstract

Some countries attempt to ‘temper’ the political party system unpredictability by introducing measures to halt fragmentation, such as representation thresholds. Here, Damien Bol, Jean-Benoit Pilet, and Pedro Riera argue that national legislators are more likely to adopt one of these electoral mechanisms when a large number of other countries have made similar choices in recent years.

Item Type:	Online resource (Blog Entry)
Official URL:	http://www.democraticaudit.com
Additional Information:	© 2015 The Author(s)
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	J Political Science > JA Political science (General) J Political Science > JC Political theory J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General) J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe)
Date Deposited:	21 Aug 2015 09:45
Last Modified:	11 Sep 2025 14:00
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/63286

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